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This paper examines the surprising performance of the Argentine stock market 
in the midst of the country’s most recent financial crisis and the role played by 
ADRs in Argentine capital flight. Although Argentine investors were subject to 
capital controls, they were able to purchase stocks with associated ADRs for 
pesos in Argentina, convert them into ADRs, re-sell them in New York for 
dollars and deposit the dollar proceeds in U.S. bank accounts.  In the paper we 
show that: (1) ADR discounts went as high as 60% (indicating that Argentine 
investors were willing to pay significant amounts in order to legally move their 
funds abroad), (2) the market anticipated (correctly) a 40% devaluation, (3) local 
market factors in Argentina became more important in pricing peso 
denominated stocks with associated ADRs, while the same stocks in New York 
were mainly priced based on global factors, (4) capital outflow using the ADR 
market was substantial (our estimate is between $835 million and $3.4 billion). 
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“In the emerging Markets, the star performance came from Argentina.  The 
Merval rose 25.6%.  This rise occurred when the country’s fundamentals took a 
distinct turn for the worse.  Draconian capital controls were introduced to 
preempt a massive build-up of capital flight...  The reason the market is going up 
is simply that the stock market is seen as a way of protecting assets and a means, 
by ADR conversion, of getting money out of Argentina.”  Investavenue.com, 
December 10, 2001. 
 
“Buenos Aires' normally sleepy stock exchange jumped 25% in the week 
following Cavallo's announcement. The short-lived rally was prompted by 
investors who loaded up on shares in a handful of Argentine blue chips, then 
converted them into their corresponding American depositary receipts, sold them 
on the New York Stock Exchange for dollars, and parked the proceeds abroad. 
Since few U.S. investors want these shares, Argentines have to sell their ADRs at 
a loss. But apparently those in search of a safe haven for their money are willing 
to pay a price”. Argentines Dust Off Their Survival Skills: They're using a vast 




This paper examines the surprising performance of the Argentine stock market 
in the midst of the country’s most recent financial crisis and the role played by 
ADRs1 in Argentine capital flight. Although the exact timing and causes of 
Argentina’s economic fall from grace are contentious, there is little disagreement 
that by the last quarter of 2001 Argentina was on the brink of a full-scale 
collapse.2 Between July and November 2001, Argentines withdrew over $15 
billion from banks -- on November 30, 2001 alone, banks saw withdrawals of $1.3 
billion.  On December 3rd, in a desperate effort to prevent further massive capital 
outflows, financial market controls were established (these are known as the 
“Corralito”), which among other restrictions, imposed a ceiling of $1,000 a month 
on bank withdrawals.3  In January the Argentine peso was officially devalued, all 
bank deposits and debts were “pesofied”, and U.S. dollar accounts were no 
longer permitted.   
 
                                                 
1 American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are shares of non-U.S. (in this case Argentine) 
corporations sold in the U.S (and denominated in dollars). Although Depositary Receipts (DRs) 
can be issued in a number of markets, all of the cross-listed firms from Argentina issued DRs in 
the United States; consequently, we will refer to Argentine cross-listed shares as ADRs.  
2 Mussa (2002) makes the case that the persistent inability of the Argentine government to run 
responsible fiscal policy was the primary cause of the economic collapse.  Others point to the 
deleterious effects of an over-valued currency on exports (see, for example, Feldstein (2002)) and 
the sudden stop in foreign capital inflows (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2002)). 
3 A literal translation of “Corralito” is little corral. It is also the word for “playpen.”  
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In contrast to the experiences of other emerging markets, the crisis appears to 
have been “good news” for the Argentine stock market.4  Figure 1 shows the 
stock market indices (denominated in dollars) in Argentina, Malaysia, Mexico 
and Thailand during their respective financial crises.5 The stock markets in 
Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand stagnated in the weeks preceding their currency 
devaluations, and then sharply declined after devaluation. While the market in 
Argentina was also in a slump two months before the devaluation, the Corralito 
triggered a 50 percent expansion of the market. One interpretation of the stock 
market run up in Argentina is that for some reason investors viewed the likely 
devaluation of the peso as beneficial for firms, whereas in other countries such 
crises are generally harmful.6 The contention of this paper, however, is that the 
idiosyncratic reaction of the Argentine stock market was largely due to the 
specific restrictions in the Corralito that allowed investors to use their frozen bank 
deposits to purchase Argentine stocks, and, in so doing, provided a legal 
mechanism for transferring funds abroad via ADRs.7 Based on data on ADR 
discounts and trading volume we find that Argentine investors were willing to 
pay a substantial price to move their deposits out of Argentina through ADR 
conversions. At their peak, some ADRs were trading at a discount of in excess of 
40 cents on the dollar. A rough estimate is that such transactions resulted in a 
capital outflow of roughly $835 million to $3.4 billion between December 1, 2001 
and May 31, 2002. 
                                                 
4  It is interesting to note that the Argentine stock market began its upturn when the Corralito was 
first imposed on December 3rd, and then rose even higher after President De La Rua and Finance 
Minister Domingo Cavallo resigned (December 19 and 20th) when expectations of an impending 
devaluation intensified.  It was not until after the announcement of the devaluation (on January 
7th) that the stock market, measured in US dollars, began its decline. 
5 The vertical line on the figure marks the corresponding devaluation date for each country. The 
flat intervals in the plot indicate periods when the Argentine market was closed. All returns are 
measured in U.S. dollars. 
6  See, for example, Forbes (2002). 
7 It is clear that the Argentine government understood the role ADRs might play in allowing 
citizens to transfer funds abroad.  However, because ADRs were associated with most of the 
largest publicly traded Argentine companies it would have been difficult for the government to 
disallow ADR transactions (and risk sending the Argentine stock market into a tail spin).  Also, 
the fact that ADR conversions did not have a direct impact on Central Bank reserves, a topic we 
will return to, meant that the government was less concerned about this channel of capital 
outflow. 
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Figure 1 Emerging Markets’ Stock Market Response During Currency Crises 
60-day window centered on the corresponding devaluation date 
(Dollar Stock Market Indices; Base=100 on the day of the devaluation) 
Source: Datastream 
 
There is an extensive literature on ADRs and their role in the global integration 
of financial markets (see, for example, the survey by Karolyi (1998)).  The holder 
of an ADR has the right to redeem the receipt for the underlying shares at any 
point, so that in the absence of capital market restrictions, and adjusting for the 
exchange rate, the ADR and the underlying share are perfect substitutes.8 Cross-
listing in the United States allows firms in foreign markets to enjoy the 
advantages of greater liquidity, transparency and access to the U.S. capital 
market.9  From the perspective of U.S. investors, ADRs are a convenient way of 
obtaining global diversification.10  In general, the literature suggests that ADRs 
are efficiently priced – after correcting for differences in exchange rates and 
transactions costs, the law of one price does appear to hold for cross-listed stocks 
(Kato et al. (1991) and Park and Tavakkol (1994)).  
 
Viewed against this backdrop, Argentina appears to be a unique case in which a 
country with a significant number of cross-listed stocks and relatively well-
integrated financial markets subsequently attempted to close its financial 
                                                 
8 Conversely, the holder of the underlying shares has the option of converting the shares into 
ADRs.  Each ADR denotes a specific number of the underlying shares (which remain on deposit 
at the depositary’s custodian bank in the issuer's home market). 
9 See, for example, Alexander, Eun and Jankiramanan (1987), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Miller 
(1999),  Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2001), and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2002). 
10 See, for example, Officer and Hoffmeister (1987), Whahab and Khanduala (1993) and Jiang 
(1998). Domovitz, Glen and Madhavan (1997), Errunza, Hogan and Hung (1999), and Karolyi and 
Stulz (2002) examine the broader influences of ADR programs on the development and 
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borders. The unusual set of circumstances in Argentina give ADRs a new, and 
previously unstudied, role as a mechanism for capital flight.11 The Argentine case 
suggests that, once having established ADRs and other kinds of contractual 
arrangements across markets, it may be difficult if not impossible to reverse the 
process of capital market integration with (even draconian) capital controls. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides details about the specific 
restrictions of the Corralito and defines the arbitrage premium/discount between 
local and U.S. ADR prices. Section 3 examines the behavior of non-ADR and 
ADR returns pre- and post-Corralito and calculates arbitrage bounds for ADRs 
based on the transactions costs that U.S. and Argentine investors faced during 
the December 2001 to July 2002 period. We then use the ADR premium to 
estimate the market’s expectation of the devaluation. Section 4 examines the 
market factors that influenced ADR portfolio returns in New York and Argentina 
before and after the imposition of the Corralito.  Finally, in section 5 we discuss 
the decline of ADRs as a mechanism for capital outflow in March 2002 and the 
rise of Argentine certificates of deposit (CEDEARs) as an alternative channel for 
arbitrage and capital flow.  
 
2. ADRs, The Corralito and the Argentine Stock Market 
 
In principle the performance of the Argentine stock market in the pre-
devaluation period is puzzling. Just one month before a widely anticipated 
devaluation of the peso and in the midst of a staggering financial crisis with 
massive capital outflows and bank runs, the stock market was booming.  To 
place the recent performance of the stock market in some perspective, Figure 2 
shows Argentina’s stock market index, the Merval, in pesos and U.S. dollars, 
from January 1990 to April 2002.  Argentina’s currency board was established in 
March 1991, triggering a stock market boom that lasted until June 1992. The 
market was negatively affected by the Mexican crisis in late 1994, and again by 
the Asian crisis in 1997, but stayed well above its pre-March 1991 level. 
Beginning in early 2000, however, the market began a steady decline, sliding 
down to levels not seen in a decade.  
 
                                                 
11 Melvin (2002) also documents the unusual behavior of the Argentine stock market and the role 
of ADRs during the Corralito period. 
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Figure 2 Argentine Merval Index (January 1990-June 2002) 
Source: Datastream 
 
2.1 The Corralito 
 
By mid-2001, years of stagnating economic growth, lagging exports, weak banks 
and mounting fiscal deficits had taken their toll. In October negotiations over a 
bailout package with the IMF failed and Argentina was on the brink of financial 
collapse. To stave off a run on banks and a speculative attack on the peso, on 
December 1, 2001 Finance Minister Cavallo announced a series of restrictions on 
bank withdrawals and dollar transfers abroad. Under the Corralito, depositors 
were limited to withdrawals of 250 pesos per week but could access their 
accounts to transfer funds within the banking system.12 Wire transfers required 
Central Bank approval, foreign currency futures transactions were prohibited, 
and in effect, all investors, foreign and domestic, were prohibited from 
transferring funds abroad. The restrictions were announced as temporary 
measures that would remain in place until the danger of the speculative attack 
had passed.  
 
The Corralito, did not, however, restrict investors from trading Argentine 
securities including those that were cross-listed on another market. Indeed, to do 
so would have seriously destabilized the local market as it would have 
prevented investors from trading in some of the largest and most liquid stocks 
on the market.  The ADR “loophole” worked as follows:  Argentine residents 
                                                 
12 Some of the original withdrawal limits were eventually modified, though the main restrictions 
on capital outflow still remain in place. See Appendix 1 for a detailed timeline of the changes in 
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were allowed to use bank deposits in excess of the $1,000 monthly ceiling to 
purchase Argentine stocks. If a stock happened to be cross-listed in another 
country those shares could be legally converted from Argentine shares into 
ADRs. The ADRs could then be sold in the United States and the dollar proceeds 
deposited in a U.S. account.  Under normal circumstances the dollar proceeds 
would appear in the Argentine Balance of Payments as a capital inflow, as U.S. 
residents have acquired claims on Argentine firms.  Under the Corralito, 
however, the capital inflows did not occur, and the dollars and/or shares 
remained outside of Argentina.  In effect, the ADR “loophole” allowed 
Argentines to transfer monies abroad, but the transactions did not result directly 
in a fall in Argentina’s international reserves (or a fall in Argentine bank 
deposits).  ADR conversions, however, did reduce the number of (underlying) 
shares available on La Bolsa. 
 
2.2 Costless and instantaneous arbitrage premia 
 
To help fix ideas, it is useful to define the trade-offs facing U.S. and Argentine 
investors. We first assume that arbitrage between the two markets is 
instantaneous and costless. While this is clearly unrealistic, it will establish a 
useful benchmark for examining transactions costs.  
 
We will use the following definitions: 
L
tP  = price of local shares, in pesos 
ADR
tP  = price of ADR in the United States, in dollars 
tS  = spot exchange rate, U.S. dollars per peso 
 ξ  = number of underlying shares per unit of depositary receipt 
 
Consider the return to an Argentine investor who purchases local shares and 
then converts them to an ADR. We take the view that given the extent of 
dollarization of the Argentine economy, investors were concerned about 
preserving the dollar value of their assets, and therefore we compute dollar 
returns. The instantaneous arbitrage premium on holding the ADR is then:  
 












The premium/discount changes with local price, the U.S. price (which is a 
function of U.S. demand) and the exchange rate.  
William Davidson Institute Working Paper 513 
 7
From the perspective of a U.S. investor, the rate of return would be  
 







ξπ −=   
 
2.3 Arbitrage with transactions costs 
 
Argentine investor 
Consider again an Argentine investor in period t who has purchased cross-listed 
stocks. The investor can sell the stocks in Buenos Aires or transform the stocks 
into ADRs and sell them in the United States. Transforming the stock into an 
ADR, setting up a U.S. account and selling the stock takes time, and involves 
transaction costs and different risks.13  
 
Define n0 as the minimum time required to sell the ADR in New York, and 
consider the following two strategies:  
 
1) Sell the stock in Buenos Aires at Lt np +   
2) Sell the ADR in New York at ADRt np +   
 
where n≥n0.  If the expected return of strategy 2 is larger than the expected return 
of strategy 1, then every risk neutral local investor (assuming all the other 
investing opportunities are arbitraged) would transform their stocks into ADRs 
and follow strategy 2. On the other hand, under normal conditions risk-neutral 
local investors would simply hold their local shares when the expected return of 
strategy 1 is bigger than expected return of strategy 2. The expected return (at 
period t) in U.S. dollars of following strategy 2 is:14 
 
 
(2)          EtR2= 3 5 4 1 2
1 2
[  (1- )(1- )] - -[ (1 ) ]   
[ (1 ) ] 
ADR L
t t n t t
L
t t
E p p S
p S






where 1 2(1 )
L
tPξ τ τ+ + is the pesos the investor needs to buy ξ local shares to 
obtain one ADR, and 3 5[  (1- )(1- )]
ADR
t t nE p τ τ+ is the dollar amount that the Argentine 
investor expects to obtain after selling the ADR in the U.S. at time t+n after taxes 
and expenses. Argentine investors typically face a broker’s fee, τ1, and a 
                                                 
13 Information from brokers suggests that the time to conversion and the implicit exchange rate 
used in the conversion process varied considerably across type of investor and across time. For 
this reason we use contemporaneous prices and exchange rates as a benchmark in computing 
arbitrage returns.   
14 Here we are assuming the conversion fee is paid in dollars in the U.S. once the operation is 
complete, and the amount is withdrawn from the investor’s banking account. 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper 513 
 8
transactions fee, τ2. A second broker’s fee, τ3, is incurred when the asset is sold in 
the United States. We also include a fixed fee in dollars, τ4, that the investor must 
pay to transform the regular shares into an ADR. Finally, the cost of opening a 
bank account in the United States is τ5. Note that the investor does not have to 
physically obtain dollars to carry out this operation (the return is simply 
expressed in dollar units) so the investor does not pay a fee for obtaining foreign 
exchange. Note also that all of the transactions in (2) were permitted under the 
Corralito. 
 
If the Argentine investor were to instead use the dollar amount 
1 2[ (1 ) ]
L
t tp Sξ τ τ+ + to buy local shares and sell them in Buenos Aires in period t+n 
for the expected (net of taxes) price, her expected return at time t will be: 
 
(3)         EtR1= 
L
1 2 1 2
1 2
 (1- - )     (1 )
 (1 )
L
t t n t n t t
L
t t
E p S p S
p S
ξ τ τ ξ τ τ
ξ τ τ




Where  1 2 (1 )
L
t tp Sξ τ τ+ +  is the amount, expressed in dollars, the investor needs 
in order to buy enough shares of the local stock to reach the equivalent of one 
ADR, and L 1 2 (1- - )t t n t nE p Sξ τ τ+ +  is the amount of money she receives for selling 
the shares after n periods. The returns are calculated net of the broker’s fee and 
the local transactions fee.  
 
For the investor to be willing to convert shares to ADRs, it must be the case that 
EtR1 ≤  EtR2 or 
 
(4)          L3 5 4 1 2[  (1- )(1- )]- [  (1- - ) ] 0
ADR
t t n t t n t nE p E p Sτ τ τ ξ τ τ+ + +− ≥  
 
U.S. investor 
We next derive the trade-off facing a U.S. investor. The trade-off is different for 
the two investors because of the asymmetries in fees, taxes and institutional 
regulations in the two markets. The U.S. investor purchases the ADR in the U.S. 
and can either 
 
I) Sell the ADR in New York at ADRt np +  or 
II) Sell the stock in Buenos Aires at Lt np + . 
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The first strategy gives the expected return to holding the ADR for n periods: 
 
(5)               EtRI=
-   
 
ADR ADR






U.S. investors do not face a broker’s fee or a stock market transactions fee.15  
 
The return to converting the ADR to local shares, and repatriating the earnings is 
given by: 
 
(6)               EtRII=
L
1 2 6 (1- - )(1 )     
 
ADR
t t n t n t
ADR
t
E p S p
p
ξ τ τ τ+ +− − . 
 
When selling the shares in Argentina, we assume that the U.S. investor incurs 
charges in using a local broker and must pay the stock market transactions fee. 
Since we assume that he would like to return the profits from the sale back to the 
U.S., he incurs an additional tax ( 6τ ) for transferring the funds. Note that under 
the Corralito repatriating the dollars directly is illegal. Presumably there are other 
means of circumventing the controls, but by ignoring these restrictions we are in 
effect understating the transactions costs faced by U.S. investors.  
 
A risk-neutral investor will cancel an ADR when t I t IIE R E R≥ or: 
 
(7)              L 1 2 7(1- - )(1 )     0
ADR
t t n t n tE p S pξ τ τ τ+ +− − ≥  
 
This suggests that if local prices (expressed in dollars) exceed the ADR price 




The trade-offs faced by Argentine and U.S. investors yield arbitrage bounds for 
capital inflow into and outflow from the Argentine market. Equation (4) can be 
re-written to show the bound facing an Argentine investor who is contemplating 
converting his local stocks into an ADR:  
            


































                                                 
15 It is not strictly true that U.S. investors face zero transactions costs. However, our empirical 
analysis focuses on the arbitrage conducted by Argentine investors during the Corralito, so we 
abstract from the relatively small U.S. transaction costs for simplicity.  
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Capital outflows to the U.S. will not occur if the transaction costs on the left-
hand-side of (8) (which are a function of the local price and the exchange rate) 
exceed the returns to the conversion.  
 
Equation (9) shows the corresponding arbitrage bound for capital inflows into 
Argentina. If the transactions costs faced by a U.S. investor are less than the 
returns of selling ADRs for local shares then we should observe capital inflows 
into Argentina.  
 
(9)              1 2 6(1 )(1 ) 1
L ADR
t t n t n t t n
L
t t n t n







− − − − ≥  
 
If the ADR premia/discount lies between the bounds in (8) and (9) neither 
investor would engage in arbitrage between the markets. Premia outside of the 
bounds should, in principle, be arbitraged away.  In the section below we use 
estimated transactions costs during the Corralito to calculate the arbitrage 
bounds. 
 
3. ADR premia during the Corralito 
 
Table 1 provides a list of ADRs listed in Argentina as of December 1, 2001. The 
top part of the table lists the shares that are publicly traded in the United States 
and Argentina. These 12 companies will be the sample for most of our analysis. 
The remaining 11 shares are traded over the counter (Rule 144a and OTC stocks) 
and as such are not required to meet U.S. accounting standards.16 In December 
2001, the 12 ADRs in Table 1 accounted for 85% percent of the Merval.  
 
During the Corralito, ADRs played three roles for Argentine investors.  ADRs 
provided (1) liquidity value (they allowed asset transformation of bank deposits 
– which could potentially be expropriated by the government or lost in a full-
scale bank run -- into stocks); (2) capital control circumvention value (they 
allowed investors to legally deposit dollars abroad); and (3) hedge value (against 
the likely devaluation of the dollar value of the peso). The first effect, asset 
transformation, should increase the value of all Argentine stocks during the 
Corralito, and the premium associated with asset transformation should remain 
until all depositors in Argentina have re-optimized their savings portfolios or the 
deposit restrictions are removed. The second effect, capital outflow, should 
appear as an additional premium in ADR prices over non-ADR prices in 
Argentina, and again should last until all Argentine investors are indifferent 
between holding their assets at home or abroad. This could be achieved either 
                                                 
16 We dropped Nortel from our ADR portfolio even though it is not an OTC stock because it is a 
preferred stock with very few transactions over this period.  
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when all of the available funds have left the country, or the cost of moving funds 
becomes prohibitively high. The third effect, the exchange rate hedge, will be an 
additional premium associated with ADRs until the devaluation takes place.   
 
Table 1 Argentine Stocks Cross-Listed in the United States 
 SYMBOL EXCH 
RATIO 
ADR:ORD INDUSTRY EFF. DATE 
ADRs      
ALTO PALERMO S.A. APSA NASDAQ 1:40 Real Estate 10-Nov-00
BBVA BANCO FRANCES S.A. BFR NYSE 1:03 Banking 1-Nov-93
CRESUD S.A.C.I.F. Y A. CRESY NASDAQ 1:10 Food-Agribus-Tobacco 18-Mar-97
GRUPO FINANCIERO GALICIA  GGAL NASDAQ 1:10 Fin Serv-Investment 22-Jun-00
IRSA INVERSIONES Y REPRES S.A. IRS NYSE 1:10 Real Estate 1-May-94
METROGAS S.A. MGS NYSE 1:10 Oil & Gas-Service 26-Feb-01
PEREZ COMPANC PC NYSE 1:10 Util-Gas,Elec&Water 26-Jan-00
SIDERCA S.A.I.C SDT NYSE 1:10 Steel 23-May-01
TELE ARG STET-FRANCE TELE  TEO NYSE 1:05 Telecom-DatNtwk 31-Mar-92
TELEFONICA DE ARGEN. TAR NYSE 1:10 Telecom-DatNtwking 23-Dec-91
TRANSPORTADORA DE GAS DEL  TGS NYSE 1:05 Oil & Gas-Service 17-Nov-94
YPF S.A. YPF NYSE 1:01 Oil & Gas-Service 1-Jun-93
     
Rule 144A and OTC shares      
BANCO HIPOTECARIO S.A. 144A BHIPRR PORTAL 1:01 Banking 27-Jan-99
BANCO HIPOTECARIO S.A. REG S -- -- 1:01 Banking 27-Jan-99
CAPEX S.A. GDR CAPPP PORTAL 1:02 Util-Gas,Elec&Water 23-Jun-94
CENTRAL COSTANERA S.A. COSPP PORTAL 1:10 Oil & Gas-Service 23-Dec-93
CENTRAL PUERTO, S.A. 144A PUEPP PORTAL 1:05 Oil & Gas-Service 1-Dec-93
MIRGOR S.A.C.I.F.I.A. - REG S -- -- 1:01 Auto-Auto Parts 27-Oct-94
MIRGOR S.A.C.I.F.I.A. 144A MIRPP PORTAL 1:01 Auto-Auto Parts 27-Oct-94
SIDERAR S.A.I.C. - REG S -- -- 1:08 Mining & Minerals 3-May-96
SIDERAR S.A.I.C. GDR SDRPP PORTAL 1:08 Mining & Minerals 3-May-96
SOCIEDAD COM DEL PLAT. SCDPF PORTAL 1:01 Fin Serv-Investment 1-Aug-93
SOL PETROLEO S.A. SLEOY OTC 1:01 Oil & Gas-Service 1-Nov-93
 
Source:  Bank of New York 
 
The difference in the ADR premium post- and pre-devaluation yields the market 
forecast of the magnitude of the devaluation.  In effect, prior to the devaluation 
the stock market served as a shadow exchange market and we exploit this to 
back out expectations of the devaluation.  After the devaluation there still exists 
exchange rate risk, but it is now priced in the foreign exchange market rather 
than in the stock market. 
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Figure 3 shows price indices for equal-weighted portfolios of ADRs17 and all 
other Argentine stocks over the July 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002 period. As predicted, 
both portfolios reverse their downward trend in the pre-Corralito period, 
increasing immediately following the imposition of capital controls. The ADR 
portfolio experiences a bigger increase than the non-ADR portfolio, reflecting the 
second two effects discussed above. The additional premium on ADR stocks over 
non-ADR stocks remains until May 2002. We also observe a dramatic change in 
the trading volume in ADRs in Argentina. Figure 4 shows the steady decline in 
the aggregate trading volume on La Bolsa over the last two and a half years. 
However, as shown in Figure 5, the fraction of ADRs in the total volume traded 
jumps dramatically at the time of the Corralito from roughly 40 percent of the 
total volume to over 80 percent. Perez Companc alone accounted for nearly 50 




Figure 3 Equal-Weighted Portfolios of ADR and Non-ADR Stocks 







                                                 
17 We use the equal-weighted portfolio to get a better sense of the movement in all share prices 
and to reduce idiosyncratic noise. Using the value-weighted portfolio reflects mainly movements 
in YPF, with a market capitalization that represents 44% of the ADR portfolio, and Perez 
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Figure 4 Number of Shares Traded and Dollar Volume of Argentine Stocks 
 




Table 2 examines the changes in prices of the ADR portfolio and individual 
ADRs following the imposition of the Corralito, Cavallo’s resignation on 
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board on January 4, 2002.18 (All prices are measured in U.S. dollars).  In the week 
following the imposition of the Corralito, the ADR portfolio jumped 7.6 percent. 
There is considerable heterogeneity in the price responses of different ADRs 
ranging from increases of 23 percent for Siderca and 15.6 percent for Perez 
Companc to a decline of 1.6 percent for IRSA. Cavallo’s resignation, which 
increased the likelihood of a devaluation, increased the value of ADRs even 
further. The ADR portfolio increased an additional 7.5 percent and Metrogas, 
TECO and Perez Companc increased over 30 percent in value. All dollar share 
prices fell after the devaluation, reflecting the change in the exchange rate. 
 
Changes in ADR premia 
Changes in Argentine prices during the Corralito tell only part of the story. We 
now turn to the arbitrage premia/discount on Argentine shares relative to the 
price of ADRs in the U.S.  Figures 6 and 7 show local and U.S. prices in dollars 
and the ADR discounts for two (Perez Companc and Siderca) of the 12 
companies in our sample of ADRs over the July 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002 period.19 
The figures also show the arbitrage bounds based on our estimates of 
transactions costs (see Table 3).20 The bottom half of Table 2 summarizes the 
average discounts during pre-Corralito, Corralito pre-devaluation and post-
devaluation periods for each company and the averages across the twelve 
companies.21  
                                                 
18 The devaluation was announced on January 7th and took place on January 11th  (to a new 
exchange rate of 1.4).  The free float started on February 11th.  See appendix 2 for more 
information regarding exchange rate developments over this period.  Note also that the stock 
market was closed on several days over this period which may have impacted the behavior of 
returns. We simply use observable prices on day when the market was open in our calculations. 
19  Similar figures for the rest of the ADRs are available upon request. 
20 The transactions costs we use in the calculations (based on conversations with brokers and 
investment bankers in Argentina) are: τ1=.3025 τ2=.1025 τ3=.3025 τ4=.2 τ5=1.0. In table 3 we 
provide transaction cost ranges that reflect amounts that were charged to both small and large 
Argentine investors. Our sources indicate that the standard length of time required for an ADR 
conversion was nine days. Large investors, such as institutional investors and bankers faced 
substantially lower costs than smaller investors, and could also complete the ADR conversion in 
a shorter period of time.  We ignore the time delay in our calculations of premia/discounts. The 
difference between the lower bound and upper bound in our estimations is around 500 basis 
points. Rabinovitch, Silva and Susmel (2000), using data for 6 Argentinean stocks with ADRs for 
the period 1993-2000 estimate arbitrage bands of around 270 basis points, suggesting both that 
transactions costs increased during the Corralito and that the transactions fees we use in our 
calculations provide maximum arbitrage bands. 
21 Here the adjustment to the law of one price is apparently accomplished in the Argentinean 
price rather than the U.S. ADR price. Huang and Stoll (2001), find a similar adjustment in the 
1992 UK crisis  (where the local price jumped to adjust to the expected devaluation), but for 1994 
Mexico, they find that the adjustment was in the Mexican ADR price, rather than in the local 
price. 
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Table 2 Price Impact of Corralito and Estimates of Expected Devaluation 
I. PERCENT CHANGE IN PRICE (IN $US): WEEK BEFORE EVENT TO WEEK AFTER EVENT 
       CAVALLO       
     CORRALITO*  RESIGNATION**  DEVALUATION     
     (A)  (B)  C     
EQUAL WEIGHTED PORTFOLIOS        
 1. ALL STOCKS  4.71  4.47       
 2. ADRS    7.58  7.45       
 3. NON-ADRS   2.52  1.78       
INDIVIDUAL ADRS         
 APSA    0.00  0.00  -46.17     
 FRAN    9.58  12.36  -48.98     
 CRES    2.98  6.31  -35.80     
 GAL    3.83  11.02  -46.60     
 IRSA    -1.63  11.39  -42.70     
 METRO    3.09  30.52  -44.83     
 SIDERCA    23.00  19.72  -40.28     
 TEL ARG    7.54  0.00  -32.98     
 TGS    9.98  20.35  -44.53     
 TECO    2.75  32.35  -40.36     
 PC    15.56  30.26  -44.60     
 YPF    4.93  10.58  -39.91     
              
II. AVERAGE DISCOUNT (LOCAL PRICE IN DOLLARS RELATIVE TO US PRICE)   
              
       CORRALITO  CORRALITO  EXPECTED  EXPECTED   
     PRE-CORRALITO  PRE-DEVAL  POST-DEVAL  DEVAL  DEVAL (2)*** 
     (D)  (E)  (F)  (G) = (E) - (F) (H) 
           
INDIVIDUAL ADRS         
 APSA            59.99%
 FRAN    -0.01%  24.01%  8.12%  15.89%  19.29%
 CRES    0.43%  11.27%  11.46%  -0.19%  58.82%
 GAL    0.16%  25.97%  3.03%  22.94%  33.29%
 IRSA    -0.13%  16.96%  7.54%  9.43%  28.64%
 METRO    -3.45%  9.14%  5.31%  3.84%  23.72%
 SIDERCA    -0.05%  26.66%  30.25%  -3.59%  45.52%
 TEL ARG    -0.81%  12.73%  8.60%  4.13%  76.00%
 TGS    -0.10%  26.63%  -0.56%  27.19%  29.13%
 TECO    0.00%  24.24%  47.63%  -23.39%  38.97%
 PC    -0.07%  27.74%  7.45%  20.29%  22.62%
 YPF    1.61%  17.95%  10.03%  7.92%  48.72%
              
 Average    -0.22%  20.30%  12.62%  7.68%  40.39%
 
*pre-corralito week 11/28/2001, post-corralito week 12/5/2001-12/7/2001 
** pre-resignation week 12/17/2001 - 12/19/2001; post-resignation week 12/20/2001 - 12/27/2001 
*** change between 1/4/2002 and 1/11/2002  
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Figure 7 Argentine and U.S. Prices and Premia for Siderca (U.S. Dollars) 
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The information in Table 2 and the plots indicate that the average pre-Corralito 
premium for all companies except Metrogas was close to zero, suggesting that 
arbitrage between Argentina and the U.S. kept prices in close alignment. During 
the Corralito, the average ADR discount (the local price less the ADR price) 
jumped to 20 percent. The plots suggest that the ADR discounts were relatively 
small at the beginning of the Corralito and peaked just prior to the devaluation. 
One interpretation of this evidence is that the shadow value of the exchange rate 
hedge via ADRs increased as the devaluation became more likely in early 
January 2002. At their peak, the discount reached close to 40 cents on the dollar 
for Banco Frances, Banco Galicia, Perez Companc and Siderca.22 
 
Expected Devaluation 
We use three methods to estimate the market’s expectation of the magnitude of 
the devaluation on January 11, 2002.23 The first measure is to look at the price 
impact of Cavallo’s resignation on December 19, 2001. It could be argued that up 
to that point the Corralito was still viewed as a temporary measure to bolster the 
peg. The news of the resignation was clearly a signal that the peg would be 
abandoned. Column B in Table 2 shows the weekly change in the local price of 
ADRs before and after the resignation. On average, prices jumped 16.7 percent, 
suggesting a roughly 17 percent increase in the value of the exchange rate 
hedge.24 
 
The second measure of the anticipated devaluation is to examine the difference 
between the ADR discount in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. Under the 
assumption that the shadow value of ADRs as a means of converting bank 
deposits and for capital outflow over the period remained constant, the 
difference between the pre- and post-devaluation periods isolates the value of 
the exchange rate hedge. The difference between the average discount in the two 
periods is shown in Table 2 column G. The difference ranges considerably across 
ADRs, averaging out to roughly 8%. This is likely to be an understatement of the 
hedge term, however, because the ADR discount started small and increased 
                                                 
22 According to brokers and the financial press, the most demanded ADRs have been (in order of 
importance): Perez Companc (PC), Grupo Financiero Galicia, Siderca and Telecom. In December 
2001, the number of shares of PC traded in NYSE increased 170%. The likely reason investors 
preferred these specific stocks is that they were the ones with the highest liquidity in the U.S. 
market. Our preliminary research on the cross sectional differences in the stocks’ premia (based 
on panel data) confirm that liquidity seems to be the most important factor in explaining the 
differences in premia across firms.  
23 Becjker, Gelos and Richards (2002) estimate devaluation expectations from the relative 
performance of a cross section of Mexican publicly traded firms around the 1994 peso crash. 
Using an estimate of the exchange rate exposure of the different firms, they construct a measure 
of the shadow exchange rate prior to devaluation. In future research we will further explore the 
information from our cross-section of ADRs for alternative measures of expected devaluation. 
24 One could also argue that the resignation was a further sign of political instability, which 
would also increase the demand for ADRs as vehicles for capital outflow.  
William Davidson Institute Working Paper 513 
 20
dramatically in the pre-devaluation sample. It is more likely that prices on the 
eve of the devaluation came closest to reflecting the market’s expectation of the 
change in the exchange rate. Using the discounts just before and just after the 
devaluation as our measure, column H shows an average devaluation of 40.4 
percent (with a range of between 19 and 76 percent). This is larger than the other 
two estimates and it is exactly the magnitude of the official devaluation for 
foreign trade operations, although it is less than the free market rate devaluation 
of 70 percent that applied to all other transactions.  
 
In addition to calculating the expected magnitude of the devaluation, we can use 
ADR transactions data to estimate the magnitude of capital outflow.  The most 
accurate measure of the volume of outflow would be to use the number of ADR 
conversions that occurred after the imposition of the Corralito. Unfortunately, 
these figures are not publicly available. An alternative measure is to take the 
post-Corralito cumulated volume of sales of Argentine ADRs in New York, under 
the assumption that all ADR sales reflect cashing out by Argentine investors. 
This figure comes to $835 million.25 This is likely to be an underestimate of the 
volume of outflow, since many investors may simply hold the stock rather than 
sell at depressed prices. Another measure is the cumulated volume of purchases 
of local stocks with associated ADRs in Buenos Aires over this period. Under the 
assumption that all these purchases are intended for ADR conversion, the value 
of capital outflow comes to $3.4 billion dollars. This is likely an overestimate, 
since Argentines may have had other reasons for purchasing these stocks besides 
ADR convertibility.  
 
4. Market Factors and the Pricing of ADRs  
 
Until this point, we have analyzed the time series of ADR and local prices in 
isolation. We now turn to the pricing of ADR stocks in the context of overall 
market movements in Argentina and New York. 
 
In theory, in a fully liberalized and integrated financial environment, we would 
expect ADRs to be priced based on global market factors.  Investors with access 
to global assets should expect returns to be based on covariances of individual 
stocks and the global market portfolio.  That said, in practice, Karolyi and Stulz 
(2002) find that home bias tends to increase local influences on asset prices.  They 
find that local market portfolios often better explain the cross-sectional variation 
in expected returns for local stocks, though they also find that equity flows and 
cross-country correlations increase global influences on asset prices. 26 The 
                                                 
25 This is the cumulated sum between December 1, 2001 and May 31, 2002. 
26 Also see Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) and Alexander et al (1987) 
who examine the pricing of ADR portfolios in the context of the market model and generally find 
evidence that global market factors dominate local factors in explaining ADR returns. 
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pricing of Argentine ADRs provides an interesting natural experiment in the 
context of this literature.  Prior to the imposition of the Corralito, Argentina’s 
financial markets were considered fully liberalized.  The Corralito, although 
allowing ADR transactions to continue, was intended to control capital outflows 
and therefore presumably led to a less globally integrated Argentine capital 
market.  In terms of the market model, we should therefore expect that local 
market factors in Argentina became more important in pricing stocks with 
associated ADRs during the period in which capital controls were in force. 
 
We test whether the imposition of the Corralito led to changes in the pricing of 
Argentine stocks with associated ADRs using a standard market model; where 
itR  is the return on asset i at time t, ftR  is the return on the risk-free rate at time t, 
G
mtR  is the return on the global market portfolio at time t, and 
L
mtR  is the return on 
the local market portfolio at time t: 
 
(10)           1 2( ) ( ) .
G L
it ft mt ft mt ft itR R R R R Rβ β ε− = − + − +  
 
Evidence of market segmentation would be indicated by a significant coefficient 
on the local market index, β2.  Table 4 presents daily time series results27 from 
regressions of returns from the portfolio of Argentine stocks that have associated 
ADRs on the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) world index and an 
orthogonalized local Argentine equal-weighted portfolio index (excluding the 
stocks with associated ADRs).28  Regression results are presented both for the 
period prior to the imposition of the Corralito (specifically October 1997 through 
November 2001)29 and for the post-Corralito period (over rolling subperiods to 
take into account potential parameter instability).30 
                                                 
27 Daily returns correspond to close-to-close prices including dividends and excluding weekends 
and holidays. A potential problem with daily market model regressions is the occurrence of non-
overlapping trading hours across markets due to different time zones, trading schedules and 
country-specific holidays. In our study, the extent of non-synchronous trading across national 
stock markets is compounded by the fact that the Argentine stock market was closed for several 
days during the height of the crisis. We include dummy variables in the regressions to control for 
the possibility of abnormal returns after these market closures and in future drafts of the paper 
we will include the Scholes and Williams (1977) non-synchronous trading correction. 
28  The correlation between the MSCI and the non-ADR Argentine portfolio is quite high (.53 for 
the period October 1997 – July 2002).  We therefore orthogonalize the non-ADR Argentine 
portfolio by regressing it on the MSCI and use the residuals from this first stage regression for 
L
mtR  in the estimation of equation 10. 
29 In the pre-Corralito subperiod regressions seven dummy variables are also included as 
independent variables in the market model as controls for days on which we might expect 
abnormal returns due to non-market factors.  The first dummy variable indicates dates when the 
Argentine market was closed due to holidays, the second indicates days when the Argentine 
market was closed for other reasons (days on which the New York market was closed are 
omitted).  And, the other five dummy variables were included to indicate the day on which a 
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Table 4   Explaining Argentine Stock (with associated ADRs) portfolio returns 






  Local 
Market 
Index 
      
  β1 t-stat β2 t-stat R2 Obs 
Pre-corralito 0.417 8.426 0.832 21.684 0.45 1038
Post-corralito             
Dec ’01 - Feb ‘02 0.477 0.939 1.459 7.469 0.69 48
Jan - Mar ‘02 0.338 0.789 1.224 8.552 0.86 52
Feb - Apr ‘02 0.269 0.879 1.026 6.599 0.87 53
Mar – May ‘02 0.68 1.661 0.909 3.673 0.7 57
Note: The global market index is the MSCI world index return and the local market 
index is an orthgonalized equal-weighted portfolio (in dollars) of all the stocks traded 
in Buenos Aires except those with an associated ADR.  The dependent variable is the 
return in Argentina of an equal-weighted portfolio of the 12 stocks with associated 
ADRs.  Data source: Economatica. 
 
The results in table 4 suggest that both Argentine market factors and global 
market factors were important in pricing Argentine stocks with associated ADRs 
even before the imposition of the Corralito.  In the period when the Corralito was 
in place, both indices continue to be statistically significant, though the beta on 
the Argentine market index is typically larger in magnitude.  The beta on the 
Argentine market index rises almost twofold (to 1.5) in the two months 
immediately following the imposition of the Corralito, indicating that stocks with 
associated ADRs magnified Argentine market movements in this period.  These 
results confirm our initial hypothesis that local market factors in Argentina 
became more important in pricing stocks with associated ADRs (and presumably 
all Argentine stocks) during the period in which capital controls were in force. 
 
The model in section 2 and the data description in section 3 of this paper suggest 
that the pricing of ADR stocks in Argentina and New York may have diverged 
during the Corralito period.  And, in particular, we might expect that while local 
factors influenced prices in Argentina (as reported in table 4), they may not have 
been as important for prices of the same stocks sold in New York (given that 
                                                                                                                                                 
new ADR was included in the ADR portfolio (Banco Galicia entered on 7/4/2000, APSA on 
11/15/2000, PC on 1/26/2000, Nortel on 6/19/1997 and Siderca on 5/21/2001) as we might 
expect the return on the overall ADR portfolio to rise on these days in reaction to its new 
composition. These estimates are not reported in the tables but are available upon request. 
30 In the post-Corralito subperiods we also include the change in the peso/dollar exchange rate as 
a third factor in the market model to control for the large devaluation that took place on January 
11, 2002.  The coefficient on the exchange rate term is generally statistically significant and ranges 
in magnitude from .1 to .5 depending on the subperiod.  This coefficient can also be interpreted 
as an estimate of the peso exposure of the ADR portfolio. 
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investors in New York were not subject to the restrictions of the Corralito).  Table 
5 presents time series results from regressions of Argentine ADR portfolio 
returns in New York (NYSE and Nasdaq) on the MSCI world index and an 
orthogonalized local Argentine equal-weighted portfolio (excluding the ADRs).   
 
Table 5   Explaining ADR Portfolio Returns in New York Using A Global Market 





  Local 
Market 
Index 
      
  β1 t-stat β2 t-stat R2 Obs 
Pre-corralito 0.616 12.44 0.883 22.78 0.55 1054
Post-corralito       
Dec ’01 – Feb ‘02 0.336 1.176 0.057 1.322 0.06 61
Jan – Mar ‘02 0.596 1.945 0.084 2.304 0.17 61
Feb – Apr ‘02 0.496 1.992 0.168 3.748 0.27 62
Mar – May ‘02 0.733 3.648 0.128 3.287 0.35 64
Note: The global market index is the MSCI world index return and the local market index is an 
orthgonalized equal-weighted portfolio (in dollars) of all the stocks traded in Buenos Aires 
except those with an associated ADR.  The dependent variable is the return in New York of an 
equal-weighted portfolio of the 12 ADR stocks.  Data source: Economatica 
 
The results for the pricing of ADR stocks in the post-Corralito subperiod reported 
in table 5 differ markedly from those in table 4.   Recall that the dependent 
variable for the regressions reported in table 4 is the return in Argentina of a 
portfolio of stocks with associated ADRs, while in table 5 we examine the pricing 
of these same stocks after they are converted to ADRs and traded in New York.  
In both sets of tests the results in the pre-Corralito period are similar.  The results 
suggest that although the Argentine market was relatively more integrated 
before the imposition of the Corralito – it is still the case that local (Argentine) 
market factors as well as global factors were important in explaining ADR 
portfolio returns in both Argentina and New York.  In the period immediately 
following the imposition of the Corralito (and when volume in the ADR market 
was at its peak) neither the global market index nor the Argentine market index 
explain ADR portfolio returns in New York (whereas in Argentina local market 
factors become more important in explaining the pricing of stocks with 
associated ADRs over this period).   In the subsequent two-month rolling 
subsamples the global market index beta regains statistical significance and rises 
in magnitude for the ADR portfolio returns in New York.  The coefficient on the 
local market index also regains statistical significance, though the size of the local 
market beta falls dramatically from .88 in the pre-Corralito subperiod to .08 in the 
subperiod including January through March 2002. 31  These results suggest that 
after the imposition of the Corralito Argentine market factors no longer had as 
                                                 
31 The regression goodness of fit also falls dramatically from .55 in the pre-Corralito period to .17 
for the period January through March 2002. 
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much influence on the pricing of Argentine ADRs in New York.  Or, put another 
way, ADRs in New York became less like other Argentine stocks (including those 
with associated ADRs) with the advent of capital controls.   
 
5. The Emergence of the CEDEAR market 
 
In late February 2002 volume in the ADR market, which had reached its peak in 
December 2001 just after the imposition of the Corralito, leveled off.32   Although 
the Corralito continued to be in effect, several regulatory changes, starting in 
February 2002, may have diminished investor’s incentives to use the stock 
market as a means to gain access to frozen assets.33  At the same time as interest 
in ADRs was stalling, volume in the CEDEAR (certificados de depositos 
Argentinos) market began to rise dramatically, so much so that by May 2002 
volume in CEDEARs exceeded volume in all other listed stocks on La Bolsa.   
 
CEDEARs are shares of non-Argentine firms (mostly U.S. firms) that are cross-
listed on the Argentine exchange and sold for pesos.34 They were first introduced 
on the Argentine stock exchange in 1997, though volume in the market was 
negligible until late February 2002.35  Before the imposition of the Corralito it is 
not clear why an investor would have preferred holding a CEDEAR (in pesos) to 
holding the foreign stocks directly (and in dollars), especially given that they had 
to pay high conversion fees for the CEDEARs.  However, after the imposition of 
the Corralito investors were no longer able to use dollars to purchase non-
Argentine stocks.  Indeed, one of the few ways investors were able to gain access 
to their frozen bank deposits was to purchase shares on La Bolsa.  For this reason 
we might have expected Argentine demand for CEDEARs to have increased 
during the Corralito and especially after the devaluation, both because 
underlying CEDEAR assets are denominated in dollars (although CEDEARs are 
priced in pesos), and because holding shares of non-Argentine firms would serve 
as a better means of hedging against the looming economic crisis.  Volume in the 
CEDEAR market, however, did not immediately pick up in large part because 
                                                 
32 This is particularly true in New York where ADR volume declines steadily from its peak in 
December 2001. Volume in February 2002 was 18 percent lower than the previous December, and 
by May 2002, volume was a mere 23% of what it had been in December 2001.  
33 In February investors were allowed to withdraw (once and for all) 7,000 U.S. dollars from any 
of their bank accounts.  In March investors were given the option to convert deposits into bonds 
(in pesos or dollars) and they were allowed to use their deposits to purchase properties, and 
more recently, cars. 
34 Most CEDEARs are issued by Deustche Bank, which acts as the depositary bank, and is the 
only authorized institution that can transform CEDEARs back into shares sold on U.S. exchanges.  
The most traded CEDEARs in this period included Cisco Systems, Honeywell, International 
Paper, JP Morgan Chase and Wal-Mart stores. 
35 In December 2001 the volume of CEDEARs was approximately 0.2% of the total volume traded 
(stocks plus CEDEARs) on La Bolsa, whereas in June 2002 CEDEARs made up 70% of total 
volume traded.  
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there was little incentive for anyone to convert U.S. stocks into peso denominated 
CEDEARs before the devaluation.36 
 
Starting in late February 2002, however, liquidity in CEDEAR stocks gradually 
increased.   Discussions with brokers in Argentina suggest that the increase in 
CEDEAR liquidity came from three sources.  First, mutual funds, pension funds 
and other institutional investors are required to hold assets rated above BBB, and 
at this time all Argentine stocks and bonds were below the minimum ranking, 
forcing these funds to purchase non-Argentine securities. Since the Corralito 
disallowed direct purchases of foreign assets CEDEARs were among the few 
assets that they could acquire. Second, Argentines who held dollars abroad 
(possibly as a result of an earlier sale of ADRs) started to purchase U.S. stocks 
with CEDEAR conversions, and re-sell the CEDEARs in Argentina for pesos, as a 
means to bring monies back into Argentina (and at the same time gaining the 
CEDEAR premium). 37 Third, using operations called “via cable” investors were 
able to buy foreign bank checks that allowed them to purchase the underlying 
U.S. shares, convert these into CEDEARs, and then sell the CEDEARs (at a 
premium) in Argentina for pesos.38 
 
Once liquidity in the CEDEAR market was established, investors had an 
alternative means of escaping the Corralito, by purchasing CEDEARs in 
Argentina for pesos, converting them back to the underlying dollar denominated 
stocks, and selling them in New York for dollars (that then are deposited in 
dollar accounts).39  The transaction costs of CEDEAR conversion are similar to 
those in the ADR market, and the increased demand for CEDEARs in Argentina 
led to similar price spreads on CEDEARs in Argentina relative to the underlying 
prices of the stocks in New York. Before the Corralito, the mean CEDEAR 
premium was approximately zero, but in March 2002 the premium increased to 5 
percent.40 
                                                 
36Traders had little incentive to convert U.S. stocks into CEDEARs prior to the devaluation both 
because of peso value uncertainty and because the Corralito restricted repatriation of any peso 
returns. 
37 One reason to do this was that after “the pesofication” investors could repay dollar debts with 
pesos. 
38 Another way that CEDEARs may have been created is through a practice termed “pre-
releasing” where the Depositary Bank lends out the underlying securities that make up the 
CEDEAR to brokers in the market.  The brokers then sell the CEDEARs to investors who pay in 
pesos and then request that the broker convert the CEDEARs back into the underlying U.S. 
shares (and sell them in New York for dollars).  
39 Investors also purchased (in pesos) dollar denominated Argentine government bonds 
(specifically Global 2008s) and re-sold them in New York (for dollars) for similar reasons. 
40 Since liquidity for most of the CEDEARs in Buenos Aires is low and the transactions occur at 
irregular and infrequent intervals, we calculate the premium for each of the CEDEARs on the 
days when there is a closing price in both markets. The index is then the average of the daily 
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There is clear indication that the Argentine government understood that 
CEDEARs were serving a similar purpose as ADRs in allowing investors to 
transfer funds (legally) outside of Argentina. On March 25, 2002 a report in the 
official BCRA press communication suggests that the government considered 
adopting new measures to avoid capital outflows using ADR and CEDEAR 
transactions. However, no restrictions were imposed at that time. In September 
2002, regulations were changed that increased the cost of conversions.41 Despite 





Argentina in late 2001 and early 2002 provides an unusual opportunity to 
analyze the reactions of investors to capital controls.  The Corralito, originally put 
in place to stave off a devaluation of the peso, effectively served to provide 
incentives for Argentines to invest in the Argentine stock market, helping to fuel 
a boom in La Bolsa even as the Argentine economy was headed toward collapse.   
The Corralito also provided a new role for ADRs as a  (legal) mechanism for 
capital flight.  Investors were able to purchase Argentine stocks with associated 
ADRs for pesos in Argentina, convert them into ADRs, re-sell them in New York 
for dollars and deposit the dollar proceeds in U.S. bank accounts.   
 
In the paper we show that ADR discounts went as high as 60% in the pre-
devaluation period, indicating that Argentine investors were willing to pay 
significant amounts in order to move their funds abroad and to hedge the dollar 
value of their assets. In effect, the stock market served as a shadow exchange 
market, which allows us to back out the market’s implicit forecast of the size of 
the devaluation. On the eve of the devaluation, we estimate that the market  
(correctly) anticipated a 40% devaluation. 
 
We also test whether the imposition of the Corralito led to changes in the 
underlying pricing structure of ADR stocks in Argentina and New York.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
premia. This is obviously a rough measure of the CEDEAR premia, and we leave a complete 
analysis of this market to future analysis.  
41 The central bank passed a very restrictive regulation (circular #3723) that mandated that every 
stock be traded in its original currency.  Since access to dollars and the use of dollars was greatly 
restricted already, this effectively killed the CEDEAR market.  After intense opposition from the 
financial community, the central bank rescinded #3723 and instead passed a resolution (circular 
#3727) that forbids “contra cable” operations.  These operations allowed brokers to sell stocks 
purchased in Buenos Aires instantaneously in New York (or any foreign market) using the 
Mercado de Valores as a clearinghouse.  Under #3727 it is still possible for investors in Argentina 
to convert CEDEARs and sell them in New York, but this new restriction significantly increases 
the transactions costs to do so.  CEDEAR trading volume has fallen more than 35% since  “contra 
cable” operations were disallowed. 
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Corralito, although allowing ADR transactions to continue, was intended to 
control capital outflows and therefore should have led to a less globally 
integrated Argentine capital market.  We find strong evidence of an increase in 
Argentine market segmentation after the imposition of the Corralito.  We find that 
local market factors in Argentina became more important in pricing peso 
denominated stocks with associated ADRs, though we find that the same ADRs 
in New York are mainly priced based on global factors. 
 
Argentine investors continue to use financial markets, and increasingly the 
CEDEAR market, to gain access to their frozen bank deposits and to place their 
assets abroad in dollar accounts.  We estimate that capital outflow using the ADR 
market over the December 2001 to May 2002 amounted to $835 million to $3.4 
billion.   If we include capital outflows via CEDEARs and other cross-listed 
securities, it is likely that the amount of capital that has (legally) left Argentina 
since the imposition of the Corralito is many times higher. 
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Appendix 1 
Argentina’s Financial Market Event Time Line 
 
 
October 28, 2001 
Minister Cavallo starts negotiations with the IMF and the U.S. 
Treasury to purchase collateral for new bonds to be issued in an 
exchange for the nearly $100 billion of local and external debt. 
 
 
October 29, 2001 
Mr. Cavallo defines the debt exchange operation as voluntary. The 
old debt would exchange for bonds paying seven percent per year 
and be guaranteed by tax revenues. The IMF and U.S. Treasury ask 
for compliance with a zero deficit and an agreement with the 
provinces on tax revenue sharing before any kind of financial 
support is given. 
 
November 19, 2001 
The IMF announces it will not make any new disbursements (around 
1.3 billion dollars) without being satisfied that the country has 
secured the goals previously designated. 
 
November 30, 2001 
End of a debt swap with local banks and pension funds for more that 





December 2, 2001 
The government announces cash withdrawal limits (Corralito) and 
limits dollar transfers abroad as a last-ditch effort to fend off a 
devaluation and prevent a major banking crisis. Withdrawals are 
limited to 250 pesos (dollars) per week per account. Depositors, 
however, may still access their funds for larger purchases through 
checks or debit cards and transfer their money among banks. No 
limits are placed on domestic payments through the use of checks, 
credits, debit cards and electronic MEP (Metodo Electronico de Pagos) 
payments. Initially the government stated that the Corralito would 











December 3, 2001 
 
The measures announced on Dec 2nd come into full effect through 
Decree 1570-01 on Dec 3rd. They can be summarized as follows: 
a) Wire transfers are not allowed without prior Central Bank 
approval. 
b) Cash withdrawals from the Banking System will be limited to US$ 
1000 per month. 
c) Financial Argentine institutions may not participate in foreign 
currency futures transactions. 
d) Financial Argentine institutions are prohibited from issuing new 
bank loans denominated in Argentine Pesos. All new loans must be 
issued in U.S. dollars and existing peso loans must be converted to 
U.S. dollar loans at a one to one rate. 
e) Foreign investors trading in the Argentine Securities Market are 
subject to the repatriation restriction. Funds related to securities 
transactions must remain in the country until government approval 
is obtained or the measure is officially revoked. 
 
December 4, 2001 
The Merval Index (Buenos Aires Stock Exchange) increases 6%. 




December 7, 2001 
Following Decree 1570, the Central Bank established an information 
procedure for the processing of automatic and non-automatic 
authorizations of repatriation. According to this rule, coupon 
payments on National Government Bonds have automatic transfer 
authorization and all other types of payments and repatriations of 
U.S. dollars are subject to Central Bank approval. 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper 513 
 32
December 19, 2001 Mr. Cavallo and all other ministers resign. 
 
December 20, 2001 
President Dela Rua resigns and Mr. Ramon Puerta becomes interim 
president. Country Risk reaches 4618 points. Global (sovereign) bond 
yields reach their historical maximum of 49% annual return in 
dollars. 
 
December 21, 2001 
The official Foreign Exchange Rate market is closed until the 10th of 
January, 2002. 
 
December 23, 2001 
Mr. Rodriguez Saa, governor of one of the provinces, becomes the 
new interim president for 60 days, until elections are called in March, 
2002. He declares the suspension of external debt payments for at 
least 60 days, totaling $166bn in federal and provincial debt. 
 
December 24, 2001 
The government announces that a new fiat currency (i.e., without 
foreign-currency backing) would be created (the argentino). 
 
December 30, 2001 
Interim president Mr. Rodriguez Saa resigns and the legislative 
assembly elects Mr. Eduardo Duhalde as new president. 
 
December 31, 2001 
In the midst of political instability and closed foreign exchange 
markets, the peso trades on the black market at 1.35 pesos per dollar. 
January 2, 2002 Mr. Duhalde assumes power. 
 
January 7, 2002 
 
The new Minister of Finance, Mr. Lenicov, announces the 
devaluation of the peso and a new dual foreign exchange rate 







 January 11, 2002 
After several delays, the exchange rate market re-opens and the new 
dual exchange rate system is put in place, under the “Public 
Emergency and Exchange Regulations” approved by Congress. The 
main articles and measures are the following: 
a)  1 Argentinean peso= 1 U.S. dollar parity (Convertibility Plan) is 
abolished. For emergency reasons, the Executive Power- President- 
has been authorized to determine both the new official rate of 
exchange between the Argentinean peso and foreign currency and 
exchange rate regulations. 
b) All debts (capital and interests) agreed in ARG currency with 
financial entities - converted into U.S. dollars according to the Decree 
1570/2001- will be reconverted into the original currency agreed 
(pesos). 
c) The official, fixed conversion rate - 1 U.S Dollar=1.4 pesos will be 
relevant for foreign trade operations. The free or floating rate will be 
used for all other transactions and freely determined by the market.  
The peso was quoted at 1.8 per dollar at money-changers in Buenos 
Aires. The peso's decline was limited by the government's decision to 
reduce the amount of money in circulation through a freeze on 
deposits, withdrawal restrictions and a central bank order blocking 





January 21, 2002  
The government announces the easing of bank withdrawal 
restrictions: 
a) Up to 7,000 pesos can be withdrawn from term deposits in pesos 
(transferring that money to a checking account) 
b) Up to 5,000 dollars can be withdrawn from term deposits in 
dollars (transferring that money to a checking account at the official 
exchange rate, 1.40). 
c) Up to 5,000 dollars in a saving account can be pesofied at the official 
exchange rate. 






February 3, 2002 
Mr. Lenicov announces an asymmetric pesofication and the end of the 
dual exchange rate regime. The fundamental economic measures 
were the following: 
a) pesofication of all dollar deposits at 1.4 pesos per dollar.  
b) corporate and consumer debts are also pesofied, but at the exchange 
rate prevailing during the Convertibility period. Both deposits and 
credit will be indexed to inflation.  
c) the end of the dual exchange rate regime and a unified floating 
exchange rate determined by market forces. 
d) the right to withdraw wage and pension income from the corralito 
without any amount restrictions (before workers could only extract 
up to 1.500 pesos). 
 
February 4, 2002 









February 8, 2002 
While the foreign exchange market is closed and before devaluation 
uncertainty is resolved, the stock market index increases. The 
pesification of all debts announced in Argentina drives up share prices 
of firms heavily indebted in pesos and banks.  
The mix of announced policy measures not yet implemented, 
(including the pesification of all debts and the prospects of a large 
devaluation once the market re-opened) and the non-operation of the 
exchange rate market, induce some investors to reverse the capital-
outflow process, converting ADRs back into underlying shares and 
selling them in the Argentinean market. The implicit dollar rate 
obtained through this operation was 2.56 pesos (above the 2.35 pesos 




February 11, 2002 
The BCRA establishes a new unified free foreign exchange market, 
which replaces the two markets - official and free - implemented in 
January. The exchange rate market re-opens and the floating dollar 
exchange rate reaches 2.1 pesos, well below the devaluation 
expectations built-into asset prices.  
 
February 12, 2002 
The stock market drops an accumulated 18% in the two business 








March 26, 2002 
The Central Bank announces new measures related to foreign 
exchange transactions and ADR/CEDEAR conversions. According to 
the press release, these were aimed at improving the functioning of 
the foreign currency market and regulating the buying and selling of 
foreign currency by order and for the account of the Central Bank. 
The press communication also mentions that there will be 
coordination between the Comision Nacional de Valores (CNV) - the 
equivalent to the SEC in the U.S. - and the Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos 
Aires (BCBA) - the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange - in order to adopt 
new measures to regulate capital outflows via ADR and CEDEAR 
transactions. However, neither the CNV nor the BCBA have yet 
issued any official communication regulating these transactions. 
 
Sources:  Ambito Financiero, La Nacion and Clarin (various issues) and Pictet. 
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Appendix 2 
Argentine Exchange Rate Market Developments 
 
The Argentine foreign exchange rate market was closed (feriado cambiario) from the 21st of 
December until the 10th of January (inclusive).  During this period the shadow (or parallel) 
market exchange rate quoted at around 1.5-1.6 pesos per dollar, well above the official parity of 1 
peso per dollar prevailing before markets were closed.  
 
On January 4th the Minister of Finance announced the discontinuation of the currency board and 
on January 7th, the Minister of Finance announced the devaluation of the peso and a new 
exchange rate regime. The new exchange rate regime was a dual one, featuring an official, fixed 
non-convertible rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar (relevant for exporters and financial institutions) and 
a free or floating dollar, for all other operations and determined by supply and demand. This 
new dual regime came into full effect on Friday the 11th of January when the markets were re-
opened. 
 
On January the 11th there were two different values for the free exchange rate: dollars purchased 
with cash at 1.7-1.8 “free pesos” per dollar, and a higher exchange rate for dollars purchased with 
checks from funds in the corralito (1.9-2 “trapped pesos” per dollar).  
 
Exchange rate market operations were again suspended from the 4th of February to the 8thth of 
February, inclusive. On Sunday, February 3rd, the new Minister of Finance announced the end of 
the dual exchange rate regime and a unified floating exchange rate was put in place on Monday, 
February 11th.  On the 11th, the floating exchange rate opened at 2.10 pesos per dollar. 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET REGIMES IN ARGENTINA
Daily Exchange Rate in Pesos per Dollar: December 3rd 2001 - 31st of May 2002
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